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PAUL TILLICH'S "TRANSMORAL" SYSTEM

(with special reference to his view of
Christian ethics)

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PAUL TILLICH'S "TRANSMORAL" SYSTEM

This essay primarily seeks to demonstrate that Paul Tillich's thought can be characterized by the term "transmoral", the notion of which has, as Robert Knudsen puts it, originated from Rousseau's distinction between a level of conventionality and a deeper

level of nature beyond human conventionality.¹⁾ Its meaning, however, became radicalized especially after Schelling in such a way that it rejected any unambiguous goal of human being established even beyond the conventionality.²⁾ Under the influence of this new trend, Tillich seeks for the true meaning of human existence, regardless of what man essentially ought to be.

In order to clearly define the characteristic of Tillich's transmoral structure, one has to, therefore, first know the so-called "ethical" structures which tend to view human being as it ought to be. The Kantian and Hegelian notion of morality are singled out here for study. It is after this study that Tillich's transmoral structure is handled along with that of Martin Heidegger who had influence on Tillich to a great extent.

1. Kant and Formalistic Moral Law

Tillich, in his book *Morality and Beyond*, explains the development of ethical structures in philosophy in terms of the word, "conscience". In opposition to Richard Rothe's suggestion that "the word 'conscience' be excluded from all scientific treatment of ethics, since its connotations are so manifold and contradictory that the term can no longer be usefully defined",³⁾ Tillich insists that "despite the bewildering variety of interpretations that it has produced, it shows some clear types and definite trends,"⁴⁾ because the word "conscience" points to a definite reality. He maintains that sometimes "conscience" is considered to point to an objective structure of demands that make themselves perceivable through it.⁵⁾ This is very clear in the Kantian system. Kant wanted to maintain the unconditional demand of the moral law. Even the notion of conscience was to Kant the consciousness of the categorical imperative without a special content in it. The Kantian notion of conscience was therefore absolutely formalistic. From the voice of conscience one can know only that he has a duty. Kant points out that the moral consciousness is really based upon the idea that there is nothing absolutely good except a

- 1) Robert D. Knudsen, "The Ambiguity of Human Autonomy and Freedom in the Thought of Paul Tillich," article I in *Philosophia Reformata*, (Uitgave van J. H. Kok, 32e jaargang 1967) pp. 63, 64.
- 2) *Ibid.*
- 3) Paul Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, (Harper & Row Publishers N. Y. and Evanston, 1963), p. 65.
- 4) *Ibid.*
- 5) *Ibid.*

good will, as Edward Caird correctly indicates.⁶⁾

Good will is a will which acts not because it is forced to do so by duty, but merely because duty is its motive. The will is itself the ground of self-determination to act, as such it is never be an effect of such action. The will excludes all the influences upon the decision to act. The result of this is that in nothing we can recognize the supreme good to which we can apply the name of "moral good" except only in the consciousness of the moral law in ourselves (a consciousness which is possible only to the rational being who has practical reason).⁷⁾ Thus, the Kantian view of the moral law is directly connected with the idea of the self as furnishing to itself its own motives to action.⁸⁾ The moral law is therefore intimately related with self-consciousness. But that subjective moral law becomes a universal law in such a way that one is required to act as if his maxim (subjective moral principle) were a universal law. No particular element can be included in that subjective moral law, because any particular element may be able to affect the decision which is to be made solely by the duty as the only motif. This is why subjective moral law must be universal. Therefore what is very important in the Kantian system is that to realize the moral law is to realize the universal idea.

This universal idea in its ultimate expression is nothing else than the idea of a world to which the knowledge of an objective world in space and time known simply by the categories of the understanding is inadequate.⁹⁾ It is at this point that the supersensible world, which our theoretical reason was prohibited to catch, is now open to us through the universal moral law. Kant said that the moral law in us "allows us a view into the realm of the supersensible."¹⁰⁾ Richard Kroner also says, "Kant holds that the recognition of a moral imperative, guiding us not only when we seek the truth but guiding our will as its highest measure and goal, brings us nearer to the ultimate meaning of the world than any speculative or theoretical knowledge possible could."¹¹⁾ If one follows

6) Edward Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant II*, (McMillan and Co., N. Y., 1889), p. 173.

7) *Ibid.*, p. 176.

8) *Ibid.*, p. 190.

9) *Ibid.*, p. 173.

10) I. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. & ed. by Lewis White Beck, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949), p. 248.

11) Richard Kroner, *Kant's Weltanschauung*, tr. by John Smith, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956), p. 21.

the voice of conscience, i. e., if one fulfills his duty, he will penetrate deeper into the unknown sphere of the supersensible than any other kind of thought could do.¹²⁾

This idea which surpasses theoretical reason in its ultimate expression, however, is also the idea which is in accordance with pure unity of the consciousness of self and the consciousness of the objects. In other words, Kant's philosophy leads to a unity in which the objective nature is subordinated to the moral law.¹³⁾ Therefore, the knowledge of objective nature is not only surpassed in its value by this idea, but is also guided to its full realization by that unity of consciousness of self and object which is found in that idea. This idea stimulates us in extending our experience in the phenomenal world.¹⁴⁾ In this sense moral law can be considered to be the solution for the problem caused by finitude in man's pursuing theoretical and empirical knowledge. Nevertheless this final goal of a theoretical knowledge of the objective nature is not possible simply in a theoretical fashion. Even though the goal is pointed out by the idea which is realized through moral consciousness, that is, "conscience", it is not given to the theoretical knowledge through concrete experiences. This is what Kroner calls "Kant's ethical dualism."¹⁵⁾ To Hegel, Kantian dualism appeared unable to explain the relation between the universal moral law and the particular action in concrete experience.

2. Hegel and Morality with Content

To Hegel, the Kantian formalistic moral law is fallible, i. e., it may turn into error in particular matters because it has no content in itself.¹⁶⁾ Stemming from within and coming forth within itself, the moral self itself is the only knower of what is good.

According to Hegel, however, the moral law, in order to be a true moral law, needs the content which is acquired through existential experiences. According to him, spirit is rooted in experience which begins with sense certainty. Spirit is the final state of mind where reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world and of the world

12) *Ibid.*

13) *Ibid.*, p. 30.

14) Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

15) Kroner, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

16) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 75.

as itself.¹⁷⁾ To quote Hegel, Spirit is "an irreducible basis and starting point for the action of all and everyone; it is their purpose and their goal. . ." ¹⁸⁾ Furthermore, Spirit is the force of the whole in which all the parts are united. Hegel also said, "The whole is a stable equilibrium of all the parts, and each part is a spirit in its native element, a spirit which does not seek its satisfaction beyond itself, but has the satisfaction within itself for the reason that itself is in this balanced equipoise with whole."¹⁹⁾

But the ethical realm where this spirit is the universal moral law is generally analyzed thusly; (a) that universal moral law is still abstract and without concrete content, and (b) it is a particular individual who has the power to prescribe law for concrete existence.²⁰⁾ Therefore, "there must ensue", says Orynski, "a long series of states and forms of development before this self-contained and self-sufficient spiritual reality has been made actual and present itself to itself in consciousness, as Spirit, i. e., the real ultimate of all existence."²¹⁾ Hegel introduced three phases through which spirit is developed into the actual state.

First, Spirit becomes merely objective Spirit which exists primarily in abstract form. But it acquires actual power when it is given its entire content by the will of a particular person, such as a master or lord of the world.²²⁾ This objectivity can be the universal actuality of the self, but this actuality is directly the perversion of the self, that is, the loss of its essential being. This brings Spirit to the second stage where it recognizes "Spirit in self estrangement." The extreme objective Spirit, such as state-power or wealth, constitutes the goals for the pursuit of self consciousness. But as soon as those goals are gained, it is known to self-consciousness that they are not ultimate.²³⁾ Self-consciousness recognizes that it is estranged from itself. The consciousness turns into itself, taking a pure insight of itself. So far, instead of pure insight, the belief has been accepting external authority without pure insight. But now, pure

17) W. Orynski, *Hegel*, (Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1960), p. 49.

18) Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. by J. B. Baillie, (London, N. Y., 1910), p. 458.

19) *Ibid.*, p. 480.

20) Orynski, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

21) *Ibid.*

22) Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

23) Orynski, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

insight exists for itself by negating everything except itself.²⁴ It must be noted that pure insight cannot have content by virtue of the fact that it negates everything, while belief does contain content. This pure insight was the spirit of Enlightenment, which culminated in the Kantian Critical Reasons. Thus pure insight, like the Kantian Practical Reason, can have no existential content within it. But Hegel, being his self-appointed task to find a certain content on universal moral law, could not stay in this state. Thus he studies more about the pure insight.

The self-consciousness by pure insight first feels that it has a being with its own difference from the universal. It looks for the essence of his own, different from anything else, even the universality. This is the very point where Hegel's system departs from other systems. In other words. Hegel thought that by his logic he could solve the problem of differences like that between "particular" and "universal". According to the Hegelian system everything exists for others. "In fact", Orynski says, "the extent to which each looks after his own welfare is the extent to which he acquires the power to be a most service to others. From the smallest to the greatest there is, among all things, a reciprocity of service. Here in lay the relation of particular being to the Absolute Being."²⁵ In Hegel's words, "All things, however, have this reciprocity of utility by their very nature, by being related to the Absolute in the twofold manner, the one positive, thereby they have a being all their own, the other, negative and thereby exist for others."²⁶ Now self-consciousness comes to a state where it comprehends that in its self-certainty lies all other things, whether they belong to the sensible world or to the supersensible world. This is so because the self-consciousness is primarily for others. Both essential being and concrete actuality consist in the knowledge which consciousness has of itself.²⁷ Thus, each individual does not exist in an isolated area, but realizes itself in the relation with the whole which embraces all different "others". Thereby the individual has a universal purpose which is a universal moral law, and in that purpose all the individual wills find their particular place. Now Spirit

24) Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 553.

25) Orynski, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

26) Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 580.

27) *Ibid.*, p. 600.

moves into the final state, namely, "Spirit certain of itself; Morality". It is in this state that self-consciousness has at last achieved a harmony with all its opposites, so that the harmonies such as those between morality and nature are postulated.²⁸ The moral consciousness, knowledge, willing of duty, must be brought into relation with the manifold actuality found in concrete experiences. Hegel said that it is only through the conscience that moral self-consciousness can let its universal aspect become detached so that this aspect becomes a nature of its own; at the same time, retaining this universality within itself.²⁹ The "universal" finally has the content with which to fill its emptiness. The actual reality of conscience is an existence conscious of itself, which is universally recognized. So doing something according to conscience is the translation of its individual content into that objective element where it is universally recognized.³⁰ Now the conscience, according to Hegel, has within itself the content as well as giving the content to the universality. It not only points to the universal law but also gives to existence the content as to how to achieve this universal law. This is what Hegel called the true conscience as compared to the Kantian formal conscience. By this "true conscience," Hegel thinks, the dualistic problem in the Kantian notion of moral law is solved. The universal moral law, according to Hegel, is not something that is outside of our concrete experiences, but is rather something that is found through them.

However, Hegel agrees with Kant in his assertion that by conscience the universal moral law can be established as an unambiguous goal for man's pursuing of knowledge which implies the problem of human finitude in an epistemological sense.

To sum up, the so-called ethical structures of Kant and Hegel are basically to give an answer to the question implied in the man's finite ability to pursue the empirical or theoretical (not imaginative) knowledge.

3. "Conscience" and the "Transmoral" Structure

Tillich says again, "A conscience may be called 'transmoral': if it judges not in obedience to a moral law, but according to its participation in a reality that transcends the

28) Orynski, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

29) Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 645.

30) *Ibid.*, p. 650.

sphere of moral command."³¹ This idea of "transmoral" has been developed along the lines of Schelling, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Especially to Heidegger the notion of conscience which has a "transmoral" characteristic was very appealing. To him the call of conscience has the characteristic of demanding that a man in his finitude be aware of "guilt" which is based upon the basic "nullity" within his being. The calling of conscience summons man back from the talk of the market and the conventional behavior of the masses to our quiet "resoluteness" which transcends the moral conscience.³²

a. Heidegger and "Being and Time"

Before we can know Heidegger's notion of the "transmoral," we have to see his main structure in "Sein und Zeit."

(1) Phenomenological Approach

Under the influence of Husserl's phenomenology Heidegger tried to understand the meaning of Being, not in a world beyond world, but in human existence that is a temporal horizon within which the light of Being comes to illumine the things that are.³³ Concepts of Being are not definable in terms of hypothetical concepts which are derived from experience or thought. Indeed Being cannot be conceived of as an entity among others, but rather, Being is of all concepts the one that becomes an evidence to itself through the analysis of "Dasein," the equivalent for human existence, which is considered as Being in the world. Being does not lie in any hypothetical propositions which are isolated from it, rather it lies only in "Dasein," "Dasein," in turn, is a kind of Being which reveals itself only in the field of time. So Being can be investigated only by interpreting time. Therefore, it is understandable that for Heidegger, to understand the meaning of Being was at the same time to analyze the Being of "Dasein" by his new interpretation of time. Time was, for him, not series of moments intersected by eternity, as in Kierkegaard, but a point where the unity of three different modes of "Da-

31) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 77.

32) *Ibid.*, p. 80.

33) Thomas Langan, *The Meaning of Heidegger* (Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1959), p. 11.

sein" is revealed as "Temporality."³⁴ Modes are not objective categories by virtue of which Dasein is explained. They are related with how Dasein actualizes itself in "Temporality." It is because of this phenomenological character of Dasein that the essence of Dasein is considered to lie in its existence. This means that Dasein is not to be expressed in its "what" at the ontic level (as if it were a table, house, tree, etc.) but is to be expressed in its "mineness" of Being.³⁵ Personal pronouns such as "I am," "you are," must be used to address Dasein. So Heideggerian philosophy is a philosophy of the person who exists only in the performance of intentional act and is, therefore, essentially not to be an object. So his existence is not to be calculated by any objective hypothesis derived from empirical materials because he is not an object but to be always disclosed as he is there already.³⁶ Dasein, whose essence is within the existence, therefore, must be seen a priori as grounded upon the state of Being-in-the-world. Therefore it does not need an objective reference to be understood. It simply reveals itself through three different modes in temporality. It is at this essential point of his philosophy that he was influenced by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

(2) Three Modes of Dasein as Being in the World

Being-in-the-world implies that it was already thrown into the world and it submits itself to that world. The mode of Dasein, first of all, is "Befindlichkeit" (which is "the state in which one may be found") because of which Dasein fears what it encounters within the world and fears something which has "readiness-to-hand" (Anhanden) or "presence-at-hand" (Mithandenen) that is on the level of "ontic."³⁷ "Fear"

34) Temporality is the place where the authentic Dasein has the unity of "futurity," "Having been" and "present." Since Heidegger, under the influence of Husserlian phenomenology, rejected any objective reference point in terms of which Being is understood, he considered time to be the horizon for the understanding of Being. Being is identified in terms of how it actualizes itself in time. Being clarifies itself as Dasein which has three different modes. These three modes through which Being actualizes itself are identical with the tenses of time. Dasein has its futurity, "ahead-of-itself," its past, "having been," and its present, "Being-Alongside." When man is authentic these elements are united in "temporality" without modification of the particular characteristic of each element.

35) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Harper & Brothers, N. Y., 1962), p. 68.

36) *Ibid.*, p. 75.

37) *Ibid.*, p. 179.

is the character of this mode of Dasein. In this mode of *Befindlichkeit* Dasein is not yet truly ontological.

The second mode of Dasein, according to Heidegger, is "Verstehen" (understanding). Dasein is the possibility of Being free for its own most potentiality-for-Being. In other words, Dasein has understanding of the reason and purpose of its existence.³⁸ It is a kind of Being which has its futurity in it. Understanding is the mode of Dasein in which Dasein as the Being of potentiality knows what it is capable of.³⁹ (But this knowing does not arise from an epistemological perception, rather it belongs to the Being-there-in-the-world, which is essentially the "understanding."⁴⁰ Thus Dasein projects itself unto what is understood about itself in terms of its possibilities.

Another mode of Dasein is "Rede" ("Discourse"), where Dasein finds itself in the world. Rede is articulation of what is fulfilled by understanding. Discourse is the result of Verstehen's being put together with *Befindlichkeit*. In the mode of Rede, Dasein as Being in the world has a special character, namely, Being-with-one-another. Dasein, by means of Rede, becomes a Being alongside what is understood.⁴¹ Rede gives the "presentness" to Being in the world.

When however, Being-in-the-world belongs exclusively to Rede (Discourse), it is absorbed in the kind of Being of the "they" in everydayness.⁴² Heidegger speaks of this condition of the "everyday Dasein" as "verfallensein" (Fall).⁴³ That Dasein belongs exclusively to Rede means that the other two modes of Dasein (i. e., Verstehen and *Befindlichkeit*) are not simply put together side by side but lost by blending into each other, so that only Rede as "an idle talk" remains absolutized. It is interesting to see that *Befindlichkeit* and Verstehen and Rede are the "past" and "future" and "present" of Dasein as Being in the world. As we have seen, time is, to Heidegger, not a place where the eternal breaks in, but a place where these three mode of Dasein reveal themselves.

38) Arthur Cochrane, *The Existentialists and God* (The Westminster Press, Phila. Pa.), p. 60.

39) Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

40) *Ibid.*, p. 184.

41) *Ibid.*, p. 207.

42) *Ibid.*, p. 210.

43) Langan, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

(3) Dasein's Structural Whole; Care

Heidegger's aim was to grasp the totality of the structural whole of Dasein as Being-in-the-world which has three different modes of Being, because Dasein, only in its structural whole, is truly ontological. This he defined as "Care."⁴⁴ When Dasein becomes truly ontological Being, the fear which was in the "*Befindlichkeit*" reveals itself to be the "anxiety" which is not anxious about an entity within the world, but is simply threatened by "nothing and nowhere."⁴⁵ What Heidegger means by "threatened by nothing entity," "nowhere-in-the-world," is that "what appears to us and threaten us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of every thing present-at-hand; it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself."⁴⁶ Because world itself is ontologically inseparable from Being-in-the-world, that in the face of which anxiety itself becomes anxious can be considered as Being-in-the-world which must be ontological. Thus anxiety comes to play an important role, it comes to characterize Dasein as Being-in-the-world which does not only remain thrown in the world but project itself essentially upon its possibilities. It means that anxiety bring Dasein face to face with its Being-toward-its-potentiality-for-Being which implies that Dasein is already "ahead-of-itself" on its Being.⁴⁷ But ontologically speaking, Dasein as Being-ahead-of-itself can not signify anything like an isolated tendency in a worldless subject, thus it keeps continually itself together with Being-already-in-the-world (*Befindlichkeit*).⁴⁸ As the consequence, Dasein's first two modes of being, namely, "*Befindlichkeit*" and "Verstehen," are put together into a unity by the anxiety. So Dasein as Being-in-the-world means Being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-Being-in-a-world.⁴⁹ But it must not be forgotten that Heidegger never tried to find a logic which mediated those contradictory elements in the unity, rather he kept them in a state of paradox. This is how he differs from Hegel. Besides this "half unity" in Dasein, another element is also present, namely, the tendency of being absorbed

44) Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

45) *Ibid.*, p. 231.

46) *Ibid.*

47) Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

48) *Ibid.*, p. 236.

49) *Ibid.*

in the present world of everyday. Thus "Being-ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-a-world" comes to include one's "Being-alongside-those-ready-to-hand" within the world of everyday. Therefore, the totality of the structural whole of Dasein, i. e., Care, is finally defined as "Being-ahead-of-one's-self-in-Being-already-in-a-world-as-Being-alongside."⁵⁰ But this totality is entirely different from the Hegelian synthesis in the sense that it does not demand that the self-contradictory elements within itself be mediated by one another. In others words, each elements has its own character within the unity without modification.

(4) Dasein as Care and Death

Dasein as Care, because of its "ahead-of-itself" always comports itself towards its potentiality for Being.⁵¹ In other words, it always has something "still-out-standing." As soon as Dasein no longer has anything still-out-standing to realize, it becomes "no-longer-Being-in-the-world."⁵² In the dying of the other, one finds a no-longer-Dasein. Death means no-longer-Dasein. But this is not something simply added onto Dasein at the end, nor is it a door through which Dasein enters the world beyond this world. This is so because Dasein, due to its Befindlichkeit, has to always be in this world. Death signifies that in Dasein there is a constant lack of totality which finally finds its end with death.⁵³ So, Heidegger says, "Death is a way to be which Dasein takes over as soon as it is."⁵⁴ Further he continues, "Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case, and with Death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being."⁵⁵ Another thing important in Death is its "mineness" namely, that "I have to die, no one can die instead of me." Therefore, death is always my problem. But this most serious problem is sometimes forgotten by those who are absorbed in the "they" and think that "they only die." But an "authentic" Dasein which is related solely to itself can not evade the problem of death because death is Dasein's ownmost non-relational possibility for which

50) *Ibid.*, p. 247.

51) *Ibid.*, p. 249.

52) Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

53) *Ibid.*, p. 286.

54) *Ibid.*, p. 289.

55) *Ibid.*, p. 294.

no one can give its representative. Does the possibility of death can give any existential meaning to those who do not try to evade it? Death as "possible" is not something possible which is ready-to-hand, or present-at-hand, but rather possibility of what is always expected. In other words, Death as "possible" does not give Dasein anything to be actualized, but simply give it an anticipation itself. Thus "Being-toward-Death" is, said Heidegger, "the anticipation of a potentiality-for-Being of that entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself."⁵⁶ Anticipation, according to Heidegger, is to project itself to itself in regards to its uttermost possibility. This means that it has the basic characteristic of an authentic Being-in-the-world as Care, namely, "ahead-of-itself." In other words, Being-toward-Death comes to have the truly ontological authenticity. Therefore Being-towards-Death becomes for the first time free from its own death and is liberated in such a way that it can authentically understand and choose among the factual possibilities lying ahead of that possibility of death.⁵⁷ Because of the mode of Befindlichkeit potentiality of Dasein cannot be Being toward heaven beyond Death but can only be "authentic" in this world towards death. But there is still another problem namely, that this authenticity can never be known to those who are already absorbed in the "they" and do not even think about the problem of their own death. How does Dasein which is lost in the "they" come to find for itself the element of potentiality?

In order that Dasein may find itself in authenticity the potentiality within itself must be shown to and thereby attested by it.⁵⁸ This is possible only through the "conscience"

(5) Conscience and Guilty

Conscience, according to Heidegger, is a Call (Ruf) which has the characteristic of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. But when the call of conscience makes an appeal to Dasein it does not do so by showing a potentiality which is ideal or universal but does so by reminding Dasein of something which has already been individualized and belongs to that particular Dasein, because Dasein already has within itself Befindlichkeit. The appeal is done by way of summoning it to its ownm-

56) Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

57) *Ibid.*, p. 308.

58) *Ibid.*, p. 313.

ost being "guilty"⁵⁹ or stating that Dasein is guilty.⁶⁰ Being "guilty," according to Heidegger, is so primordial that it does not first result from an indebtedness but, on the contrary, indebtedness is possible on the basis of it. Being "guilty" signifies that Dasein is originally on the foundation of basic nullity. Nullity is inherently with Dasein's Being-free-for-its-possibility because freedom itself has an element of nullity in the sense that it is a choice of one possibility in tolerating one's not having other possibilities.⁶¹ when Dasein comes to know his basic nullity in itself it will recognize that it must be a kind of Being which is always face to face with itself in possibility which is never to be determined. Consequently, Dasein would be able to see itself having been lost because of its determined possibility in accordance with the objectified value interpreted by the "they." In this way, Dasein can be authentic.

What is most important in Heidegger's system up to this point is that Being of the traditional meaning as an entity must presuppose its ontological whole structure which is truly existential, and must subordinate itself to that structure. For example, being "guilty" in the traditional meaning, namely, transgression of universal moral law, must be modified by this new meaning. This new meaning is that it ("guilty") has been already with the totality of ontological existential Being even before the latter becomes a factual entity by falling into "they" and by being dominated by the way the public interprets the good and evil.⁶² Likewise, conscience is viewed as having to indicate a reality beyond good or evil which is publicized already. Here we find Heidegger's "Transmoral" character making an attack on the traditional ethical structure.

b. Heidegger's View of Morality

Heidegger insists that being "guilty" is not to be based upon morality but, on the contrary, morality presupposes being "guilty." As we have seen, this is due to the fact that "morality" for Heidegger is nothing more than "public interpretation" to which only fallen Dasein (which belongs exclusively to one aspect of the whole structure of Being-in-the-world i. e., Fall) heeds, while being "guilty" is essentially within the whole st-

59) Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p.314.

60) *Ibid.*, p.326.

61) *Ibid.*, p.331.

62) Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p.264.

structure of Dasein. Sartre's exposition of Heidegger is useful in helping us understand Heidegger's view of morality. Sartre says, "When I am in the inauthentic mode of the "they" the world offers me a sort of impersonal reflection of my possibilities, in the form of instruments and complexes of instruments which belong to "everybody," and which belong to me in so far as I am "everybody"; ready-made clothes, public transport, parks, gardens, common land, shelters made for anyone who needs them, and so on ..."⁶³ Furthermore, in this same fashion, morality is given to the "I" as "everybody." According to Heidegger, moral man tries to evade his responsibility for what he actually does by saying that "it is what everyone does "or" it is what the society demands."⁶⁴ Man on the contrary must be responsible for what he does and what he is due to the "guilty" based upon the basic nullity (in the structure of Being) which is more fundamental than the "public interpretation."

In this sense, Heidegger's ontology is considered to be "transmoral." As we have seen, Dasein as the structural whole of Being-in-the-world is a unity of its potentiality ("ahead-of-itself"), its facticity ("already-in-the-world"), and its imminency of Fall ("alongside-the-world"). Since the "alongside-world" is the result of two former elements which, in this case, have set side by side, Dasein as the structural whole can be considered to be really dialectical because it has within itself two antithetical elements. What is most important is that this dialectical characteristic must not be destroyed. Dasein, however, in the state of Fall loses the true dialectic within itself, because in this state the two antithetical elements are mediated into each other.

Therefore, morality which is on the foundation of the "public interpretation" is nothing else than a result of Dasein's failing to be dialectical enough to preserve antithetical elements, (namely, "potentiality" and "facticity") because of its setting of itself to a publicly determined possibility which is a "mediated potentiality" into "facticity." So morality cannot be the most fundamental basic of man's ontological being.

To sum up, in order to understand the distinction between "ethical" and "transmoral" structures, one must see in both structures how the question of human finitude is ad-

63) Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, tr. by Hazel Barnes (Methuen, 1957), p.246.

64) *Ibid.*

dressed to each in their own particular way. While in the ethical structure the basic problem of human finitude appears in an epistemological way, in transmoral structure it appears itself in an ontological way.

In an ethical structure such as that of Kant, the problem begins with the question; "How far are we able to know?" The answer comes that we know only what we can experience. (The result is that epistemology becomes "empirical.") It is clear that for Kant man is a finite being who belongs to the universe of objective fact so that he cannot look down on objects from above but merely sees and knows objects which comes to his cognitive function. Nevertheless, he, as a person, or ego, always has to have the infinite goal in his knowledge and experience. So moral law is required as his goal or aim. In other words, the ethical structure was the answer for the human finitude in an epistemological and empirical sense, The Kantian structure, however, was still lacking in a profound explanation of the relationship between these antithetical elements in man, i. e., his finite ability and infinite goal. So Hegel, having these elements mediated by one another, thought he attained the infinite goal solely by means of the particular experience of man. In other words, his moral law got the content from particular empirical knowledges.

But in the transmoral structure of Kierkegaard and of Heidegger, these antithetical elements in human being are not to be mediated by one another. If they are mediated by one another, then the human being is objectified so as to lose his being. Therefore, man must be always perfectly dialectical without any mediation in himself. The human being is always on the brink of becoming non-being by virtue of being objectified. This presents a new problem of human finitude, that is, man is always threatened by non-being in such a sense that he is about to be no more a being. To Heidegger, as we have seen, basic nullity in Dasein signifies the problem of finitude. Nullity belongs to the freedom of man to choose one of his possibilities, to choose one possibility is not being other any more. If he chooses one then he will not be a true being but will be an entity among others. This is the way how he is threatened. Finally, at the end of Dasein (death) he will remain a dead body which is not Being but an entity like a tree, etc. Being "authentic" is the only answer to this problem of finitude in the ontological sense, just as the moral law in the ethical system was the only answer to the problem

of finitude in the epistemological and empirical sense.

This is how those who are influenced by Kierkegaard interpret the problem of human being in distinction from those "moralists" like Kant and Hegel, even though they have the same starting point as Kant and Hegel, namely, human autonomy.

4. Tillich and the "Transmoral"

a. Morality and the View of History

It seems that Tillich himself does not like to use the term "transmoral." He says, "The way from Luther's to Heidegger's idea of a transmoral conscience was a dangerous one. "Transmoral" can mean the re-establishment of morality from a point above morality, or it can mean the destruction of morality from a point below morality."⁶⁵ He does not allow "transmoral" to destroy morality. But he recognizes that a process of "transmoral" is absolutely necessary in religion in the sense that morality should go beyond the sphere in which it is valid to the sphere from which it must receive its conditional validity.⁶⁶ In other words, he does not reject ethics itself but insists that ethics, in order to be a true ethics, must be confronted with the problem of relationship between morality and the changing world, and must be able to give a proper answer to it. Tillich, therefore, is willing to destroy any type of morality which does not seem to him to arrive at the right solution to this problem.

Ethics, therefore, must be intimately related to its own particular view of history. Only the ethics which has the right view of history can solve the problem arising from the changing world.

So before we go further, we must see what the problem of interpreting history is according to Tillich, which view of history has the right interpretation of history. According to Tillich, history is something that is progressing. History is something which runs ahead towards the ever new and towards the ultimately new. This movement of history cannot be imagined apart from the life process of the bearers of history. While history drives towards the new, man pursues his better life in his process of life. Tillich suggests three different kinds of life processes. "Life strives towards self-inte-

65) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 80.

66) *Ibid.*, p. 81.

gration and may disintegrate in every history-creating act life creates and may destroy itself, as the dynamics of history drives towards the new. Life transcends itself and may fall into profanity when it runs towards the ultimately new and transcendent.⁶⁷ The self-integration of life, the self-creativity of life, and the self-transcendence of life are all under the historical dimension in order to serve the historical drive towards the universal aim.⁶⁸ In other words, history, in terms of the self-integration of life, drives toward a centeredness of all history-bearers. Further in terms of the self-creativity of life, history drives toward the creation of a new, unambiguous state of things. Finally, in terms of self-transcendence of life, history drives toward the universal unambiguous fulfillment of the potentiality of being.⁶⁹ Tillich, however, sees an ambiguity in these historical aims of the life process. The totality in the process of the self-integration of life expressed in the term "Empire." But there has been, in history, no absolute empire. Empires are to become all-inclusive, but they fall away before they have reached their aim. To be all-inclusive, an empire must seek on the one hand, to keep a totalitarian control over its member, and on the other hand, it needs the creative and voluntary supports from them. Because of these contradictory elements within itself, no empire has ever achieved its universal aim. There also have been differences in the goals of the different empires. Some tribes or nations do not want to be generalized by the universal historical aim but rather want to remain as they are. No one has ever seen any empire fulfill its universal aim. No one can say what the fulfillment of the goal of empire is. Thus one can say that the self-integration of life is ambiguous.

Self-creativity becomes the aim of history in the sense that within the historical progress the new is incessantly created. Everything new in history keeps within itself elements of the old out of which it has evolved.⁷⁰ There is, however, an ambiguity within it in the sense that no one can answer the question; "Is the new taken for the sake of the new itself or for the sake of the old?"⁷¹ Therefore, in history, there al-

67) Tillich, *Systematic Theology* III, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1963), p.331.

68) *Ibid.*, p.332.

69) *Ibid.*

70) Tillich, *Systematic Theology* III, p.343.

71) *Ibid.*, p.343.

ways has been a struggle between the conservative and progressive forces.

Finally, self-transcendence as the historical goal implies that one seeks to reach an ultimate point where he can transcend even himself and each of his moments. He tries to transcend any type of struggle in the process of history. But this self-transcendence of life under the dimension of history results in two types of ambiguous attitudes toward the goal of history; first, the present situation is identical with the final stage of self-transcendence, and second, the final stage will in future.

Because every historical aim, as we have seen, has ambiguity in it, it always has been a difficult problem to interpret the significance of history for the meaning of our existence. How the meaning of history is understood really depends upon how problem of ambiguity in history is solved. If one has a different solution for the ambiguity from that of the other, he will also have a different view of history.

Accordingly, Tillich distinguishes between two types of interpretation as to the meaning of history; non-historical and historical types.⁷² Non-historical attitudes towards history demand one's elevation above history, due to the fact his history as it is gives no meaning to him.⁷³ The non-historical view of history states that the meaning of history is only from outside of itself. History is interpreted either by the category of nature or by that of "supernature."⁷⁴ The monistic modern naturalism is considered to describe the world as a unity and totality in mathematical terms and to predict the future of the world by mathematical world formula, because history has no significance within itself.⁷⁵ Many religions also explain the world history solely in terms of an eternal structure. Tillich thinks that one can see the trans-historical elements in the Chinese Tao doctrine, in the Indian Brahma had even in the Christian conservative ecclesiastical norm of interpreting history.⁷⁶ While history is interpreted as a process of deterioration, leading to the inescapable self-destruction of a world era, salvation is the deliverance of individuals from history, not the salvation of a community through history.⁷⁷ This non-

72) Tillich, *Systematic Theology* III, p.350.

73) *Ibid.*, p.351.

74) Tillich, *Protestant Era* tr. by James Luther Adams, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948), p.20.

75) *Ibid.*

76) *Ibid.*, p.21.

77) Tillich, *Protestant Era*, p.20.

-historical view of history destroys history. It can do no justice to the immanent and concrete life of man in history.

The historical view of history, on the other hand, seeks a meaning from the progress of history towards the "infinite." In this view of history the progressive intention of every human creative action is emphasized. This progress signifies either an infinite progress without an end or a progress with definite aim of "utopia."⁷⁸ Both progressivism and utopianism emphasize the inner-historical character. But they do not fully see a trans-historical element. To them the trans-historical in finite element is simply something which is derived out of the inner-historical character of history. Both inner-historical character and trans-historical character lose their own particular meaning by mediating each other.

Tillich suggests that the right answer for the interpretation of history is the symbol of the Kingdom of God.⁷⁹ Only the symbol of the Kingdom of God has within itself both an inner-historical and a trans-historical side in the fullest sense.⁸⁰ "As inner-historical," says Tillich, "it (symbol of Kingdom of God) participates in the dynamic of history, as trans-historical, it answers the question implied in the ambiguities of the dynamics of history."⁸¹ Tillich thinks that the emphasis in the prophecies has the inner-historical character.⁸² "The destiny of Israel," says he, "is the revelatory medium for the prophetic understanding of Jahweh's character and actions and Israel's future is seen as the victory of the God of Israel in the struggle with her enemies."⁸³ The Kingdom of God has its fulfillment in a historical-political sense, Mount Zion will become the religious center of all nations of the earth. But this is not the whole story. According to Tillich, the symbol of the Kingdom of God has some element which can hardly be called "inner-historical." It is Jahweh," said Tillich, "who wins the battle against enemies infinitely superior in numbers and power to Israel. It is God's holy mountain that, in spite of its geographical insignificance, will be the place to which all nations come to worship."⁸⁴

78) Tillich, *Systematic Theology* III, p. 354.

79) *Ibid.*, p. 357.

80) *Ibid.*

81) *Ibid.*

82) Tillich, *Systematic Theology* III, p. 259.

83) *Ibid.*

84) *Ibid.*

It is the most peculiar uniqueness of the symbol of the Kingdom of God that two different elements within itself do not exclude each other. According to Tillich, the New Testament's emphasis of the inner-historical appearance of Jesus as the Christ and the foundation of the Church in the midst of the ambiguities of history does not expel the emphasis of the transcendental universal side of the idea of the Kingdom of God in the so-called apocalyptic literature of the inter-testamental period also having some predecessors in the latter parts of the Old Testament.⁸⁵ The symbol of the Kingdom of God with both an inner-historical and a trans-historical character in it can give man the real meaning of the process of life within history. This symbol of the Kingdom of God manifests itself in "the history of Salvation" having a paradox within itself which is not to be interpreted by either "supranaturalism" or "naturalism."⁸⁶ Tillich labels the moment in history at which the paradoxical symbol is experienced though not analyzed by man's thinking, as "kairos."⁸⁷

Returning to the problem of ethics within the changing history, according to Tillich, there have been three great types of life and thought representing three different solutions of the problem of ethics in historical situations which are changing incessantly. These three include the static supra-naturalistic solution represented by the Roman Catholic Church and expressed in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas; the dynamic-naturalistic solution represented by the national socialist movement and expressed in the ethics of the philosophers of life; and the rationalistic progressive solution represented by Anglo-Saxon common sense and expressed in the ethics of the philosophers of reason.⁸⁸

The first solution, the supra-naturalistic solution, maintains the eternal and immovable character of ethical norms.⁸⁹ These ethical norms or commands are given by the divine

85) *Ibid.*, pp. 360, 361.

86) Tillich, *Systematic Theology* III, p. 363.

87) Tillich employs the Greek word, "kairos" which means the "right time" to express his view of history against both historical and non-historical view of history. He distinguishes it from another Greek word, "Chronos," which simply means a "formal time." By using this distinction, Tillich clarifies that time within history, in spite of its emptiness, can get meaning not from the "outside" of history nor unambiguously within history, but get in a truly dialectical fashion. Kairos is the time within history at which the meaning of history is dialectically found. This kairos therefore, could be possibly experienced only by those who can dialectically unite the trans-historical and inner-historical elements without absolutizing one or the other.

88) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 83.

89) *Ibid.*

mind for individuals to perform their social and historical practices in the world which is a system of eternal structure. The church with a hierarchical system, teaches this system and defends it against any new system.⁹⁰ But the question, "How is the 'eternal' adapted to the changing world?" has always been unanswered. Sometimes the authority of pope has been an instrument for achieving that adaption of the eternal to changing history. But Tillich thinks Rome's application of the eternal divine command has been not successful. When Protestantism and the Enlightenment arose with new systems of ethics in opposition to the supposedly eternal system of the Medieval church, the church did not preserve the divine authority perfectly but preceded with the new stream of rising bourgeoisie by preaching modified moral doctrine as evidenced in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Jesuitism.⁹¹ "By doing this," Tillich says, "either it (the Church) lost its seriousness and authority or it gave the unhappy impression of rearguard action in which every position is defended as long as possible and then surrendered."⁹² According to Tillich, it seems that this supra-naturalistic solution is non-historical. As we have seen, the supra-naturalistic non-historical view of history does not find the meaning in history itself for any aspect of human life. So also in the ethical aspect of life man must gain his infinite meaning of life from outside of history. Therefore, it is understandable that this type of solution, because of its non-historical view of history which cannot see the relationship between the eternal meaning and the concrete situation, is not able to give an answer which is adequate to both the eternal moral command and the concrete life of man in the changing world.

The dynamic-naturalistic solution, Tillich thinks, under the influence of philosophical motives of the Continental philosophy of life, especially of Nietzsche, emphasizes change itself in human life.⁹³ Change, being the chief characteristic of life, is also the characteristic of ethics. There are, says Tillich, "no independent norms above life, no criteria by which power can be judged, no standard, for a good life."⁹⁴ "This implied," he continues, "that the individual instead of being guided by the ethical norms that are ma-

90) *Ibid.*, p. 84.

91) *Ibid.*

92) *Ibid.*

93) *Ibid.*, p. 85.

94) *Ibid.*

nifest in his conscience, is obliged to merge his conscience with the group conscience."⁹⁵ It has almost same character as what Hegel calls the "objective spirit." The "objective spirit," as we have seen before, demands a belief in what the unique one, as the "Lord" or the "Master" on earth commands. It is an ethics of the "dictator." The principle of the ethics is given to the people in accordance with what the "dictator" desires the people to do at that particular moment. This dynamic - naturalistic solution to the problem of ethics in the changing world is also based upon its own view of history which is "naturalistic-non-historical."

The "naturalistic-non-historical" view of history interprets the meaning of changing history in terms of "what we need in our lives in nature, "because history itself does not give the immovable meaning. Because history itself does not provide its consistent significance, nor does God give the eternal command, man himself must obtain the principle of life in cooperation with other men. This type of ethics, thinks Tillich, can last as long as there is a society with a strong common belief and conventional morals maintained by the leading groups of that society. "Such was the situation in the acme of the bourgeois development, for instance, in the Victorian era."⁹⁶ But this "common belief" type of ethics, according to Tillich, could not maintain harmony with the newly arising dissatisfied groups, masses and nations which ask for a new order of life.⁹⁷

Finally, the rationalistic-progressive solution seeks a unity of an immovable character in the ethical principle and a changing character in that same principle.⁹⁸ People think that in history itself one can get immovable infinite principles such as freedom and equality which are applicable to human life at any time. This also has its own view of history, namely, the progressive-historical view of history which seeks the trans-historical element within the inner-historical element. As we have seen, Tillich insists that this view of history cannot completely satisfy both contradictory elements at the same time, because, to some extent, it mediates those antithetical elements within it. Likewise, says Tillich, the principles on which the progressive - rationalistic solution is

95) *Ibid.*

96) *Ibid.*, p. 86.

97) *Ibid.*

98) *Ibid.*, p. 87.

given "are not eternal enough to be ultimate principles and not temporal enough to fit a changing world."⁹⁹

Up to this point, Tillich has presented various types of ethical solution for the problem of ethics in the changing world, among which are both a supra-naturalistic and dualistic view and a progressive and rationalist view. To Tillich, the right type of solution is something which is based upon the right view of history, which view accepts the symbol of the Kingdom of God which has in itself the inner-historical and the trans-historical elements without being modified by one another. This ethics is, according to Tillich, the Christian Ethics of "Agape."¹⁰⁰ "Agape" is more than the eternal law and at the same time can break into the changing world. In other words, only "love" can do justice to both the inner-historical characteristic and the trans-historical characteristic of human life at the same time.

Concerning these two antithetical elements, Tillich developed an interesting idea of the "demonic" in history. The eternal problem of "inner-historical" and "trans-historical" in history is interpreted by Tillich as a continuing fight against the "demonic" throughout all periods of time. Only love, according to Tillich, wins the fight.

b. "Demonic" and "Love"

The idea of "demonic" has continued with the human race from the ancient period up to the present. Tillich says, "The art of primitive peoples and Asiatic, embodied in statues of their Gods and fetishes, in their crafts, and dance masks, has been brought closer to us in the last decade, not only as ethnological material but also as artistic and religious reality."¹⁰¹ Tillich's attention was attracted especially to the forms they bear. They are in the organic forms of human, animal, and plant. But surprisingly, these forms are combined with other elements which destroy the general conception of organic form.¹⁰² The "destructive element" has been always with man. This destructive element is included in man's ultimate concern.

According to Tillich, throughout the history of religion what ultimately concerns one has been designated as "holy."¹⁰³ This awareness of the "holy" is an awareness of ul-

99) *Ibid.*

100) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 88.

101) Tillich, *Interpretation of History*, (N. Y., 1963), p. 77.

102) *Ibid.* p. 78.

103) Tillich, *Dynamic of Faith*, (N. Y., 1957), p. 13.

timacy. This awareness of ultimacy imposes two different types of attitudes upon man. While, on the one hand, man seeks the "infinite" of himself by according himself with the "ultimacy"; on the other hand, he sees the remoteness and otherness of it so that he feels as if he were under the destructive judgment of ultimacy.¹⁰⁴ Tillich calls this destructive character in ultimacy "demonic." Ultimacy is expressed through a "depth" in the thing. Therefore, in order to understand the "demonic" clearly, one should understand fully the notion of "depth." The depth of a thing is something which can be disclosed only by the thing-itself. This depth of a thing which is not knowable appears as the "other" to everything. Everything points to its "other" which is not discoverable by a rational process.¹⁰⁵ This "other" of a thing becomes "other in the sense that it is not exhaustible to anything in a direct, rationally designable way. If it were exhaustible then the world could be comprehended, as in the Hegelian universal synthesis, as the necessary and unequivocal basis of existence.¹⁰⁶ This is what the existentialist despises.

The importance of "otherness" is also emphasized in the thinking of Rudolph Bultmann. He thinks that we must communicate with others as "other" rather than assuming the other to be an object which can be fitted into the world of my thought and life.¹⁰⁷ "I give up any *Anspruch* over it and I have to hear it (other) saying to me."¹⁰⁸ Bultmann makes a sharp distinction between the "Dass" and the "Was." Andre Malet explains this distinction by saying that,

The Was is what (a Thing is), what it has in common with others; whereas the Dass expresses the that, sheer otherness. The "what is the conceptual content, the nature, the essence, the substance. The "that" is the expressed advent and event. Every being is at once Was and Dass. What Peter and John have in common is that both are men, not trees or animals (the place of the Was). But at the same time they are two beings absolutely irreducible to

104) *Ibid.*

105) Tillich, *Interpretation of History* p. 83.

106) *Ibid.*

107) Andre Malet, *The Thought of Rudolph Bultmann*, tr. by Richard strachan (Doubleday & Co, Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1971), p. 7.

108) *Ibid.*

each other, each one is unique (the place of the Dasein).¹⁰⁹

By using this distinction one can see what existentialists like Tillich and Bultmann mean by the "otherness" or "depth" of a thing. It is the ground upon which things do not conquer but communicate with one another without losing themselves. It is also the ground of being which cannot be comprehended by the objective rationality but can be disclosed by itself as the uniqueness of things. This ground of being of things, insofar as it is unknowable even to those things—themselves, is the inexhaustibility of being which is the abyss of them. But this inexhaustibility is not simple rejection of all forms of being which are appreciable in a rational way. According to Tillich, form of being and inexhaustibility of being belong together.¹¹⁰ "Their unity in the depth of essential nature is the divine, their separation in existence, the relatively independent eruption of the "abyss" in things is the demonic."¹¹¹ What is important here is that "divine" and "demonic" are correlated with each other. In other words, even though the destructive demonic element breaks the form of being in measure and harmony which are knowable in rational thinking, its power is not independent but is related to the creative divine element. While our form of being is always in the transcendental direction towards the "infinite" which ultimately concerns man, it is at the same time destroyed by the remoteness of the same "infinite." These two divine and demonic elements are two different aspects of the infinite ground of being which becomes the ultimate concern of man. This divine-demonic dialectic has always been within history.

From the beginning of history, the greatest issue has been a conflict between divinity and demonry. Divinity and demonry are identical with the trans-historical and the inner-historical elements in history. Therefore, according to Tillich, human history no matter whether it is religious or not is the history of man's dealing with the problem of "demonic" in connection with "divine," just as history always implies the problem of "trans" and "inner" historical character. There have been two clear examples, the one being the supra-natural dualism in history of religion and the other being the ethical rationalism in philosophy. In the radical supra-naturalistic dualism the demonic element

109) *Ibid.*

110) Tillich, *Interpretation of History*, p. 84.

111) Tillich, *Interpretation of History*, p. 84.

and divine element are concentrated on each different sphere.¹¹² Divinity and demonry confront each other with equal power. So demonry is never defeated. The problem of demonry is seen clearly in this dualistic structure, but remain unanswered.

Not only in the history of religion but also in the history of philosophy one can see the continuity of combat against the demonic. The weapon was especially the "rationality." This is most clearly seen in the Hegelian Ethical Structure. According to this structure, people have sought to see and make visible divine clarity in the rationality of form.¹¹³ But as soon as the divinity is clearly known in this fashion not only is the demonic overcome, but the divine itself is lost. Divine in this case should lose its fundamental characteristics such as "inexhaustible," "self-manifesting," "unconditioned," and "transcendent." This movement of rationalization, i. e., comprehension of things through resolution into their antithetical element and combination of them under the rational law, robs things of both their essentiality and existentiality.¹¹⁴ The divine self-realization by rationalization is destructive against the ultimate meaning of human existence. Insofar as this divine self-realization to overcome the demonic is its highest purpose, the Hegelian ethical structure can never be successful in its purpose. According to Tillich, any artificial structure, whether it is ethical-rational or dualistic, cannot break down demonry.

Demonry is conquered only by the "divine" itself in such a way that demonic remains in unity with the divine clarity in a divine-demonic dialectic originating in the ground of being.¹¹⁵ This can be accomplished by agape love because it contains two different aspects, "eros," which is described as the desire of union and "philia," which is described as the will to be separated from and surrender itself for the sake of another. This agape love can only maintain both divine-demonic in a dialectic. Where this dialectic is maintained human existence has ultimate meaning even in changing history.

This love which solves the problem that no other ethical or religious structure in history could have solved, can be properly analyzed only in the ontological-existential way.

112) *Ibid.*, p. 101.

113) *Ibid.*, p. 108.

114) *Ibid.*, p. 117.

115) *Ibid.*, p. 122.

Up to this point, it has become clear that Tillich rejects the so-called ethical structure because it can give no answer for the question of whether or not a man have an ultimate meaning of life in the ambiguous process of history. Instead, Tillich builds another types of ethics, namely, the ethics of love based upon the term love. This basis differentiates Tillich's ethics from all other traditional ethical structures. But the question is where this love comes from. Is it from the moral law or from somewhere else?

c. "Love" and its Origin (Being-Itself)

Tillich says, "Life is being in actuality and love is the driving power of life."¹¹⁶ "In these two sentences," continues he, "the ontological nature of love is expressed. They say that being is not actual without the love which drives everything that is towards everything else that is. Love is the drive towards the unity of the separated."¹¹⁷ This means that man has inherently in his being a notion of "being separated from." Tillich followed Schelling in his distinguishing essence and existence. In his existence man is actually in the state of "being separated from." Nevertheless, "man is not entirely," Knudsen says, "given over to his situation: there is still the recollection of the essential state from which in his finite freedom he is fallen."¹¹⁸ In other words, man is living his life in a way of seeking his original essentiality. This essence, however, is also ambiguous. Tillich followed the lead of Jakob Bohme and Schelling in teaching that man's idea essentiality cannot rest in itself isolated from the fallen existence.¹¹⁹ Man's reunion to his essentiality does not exclude the notion of separation. The dialectic of reunion and separation, essence and existence, ideal and real is itself in a tensionfilled unity which is rooted in the ground of being, which is man's ultimate concern.¹²⁰ As we have seen before, this dialectical character in man is always on the brink of losing its paradoxical

116) Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice* (Geoffrey Cumberlege Oxford University Press, London, N. Y., Tronto, 1954), p. 25.

117) *Ibid.*

118) Knudsen, "The Ambiguity of Human Autonomy and Freedom in the Thought of Paul Tillich" II, p. 32.

119) *Ibid.*, p. 33.

120) *Ibid.*, p. 34.

significance. This is so because the preservation of the dialectical character is possible only through "love," love being the "reunion" with "separation" in it. Love is itself agape love which has within itself eros love and philia love. The characteristic of eros is being reunited, while the characteristic of philia is being separated.¹²¹ Agape love can keep the dialectic of reunion and separation without breaking down the paradox in it. Our question, however, is "where does this love come from?" We will know the character of Tillich's ethics of "love," when this question is answered. To answer this question we have to ask another question, namely; "What does the reunion by love mean to man's actual life" or "What does the separation actually mean to man?"

Tillich says, "... in agape ultimate reality manifests itself."¹²² The reunion to which agape leads man is the reunion with the "ultimate reality." The union with "ultimate reality" demands the total surrender of the man who participates in that union. In other words, man in the reunion means that this man has ultimate concern for the sake of which he can give up anything else.¹²³ "If a national group," Tillich says, "makes the life and growth of the nation its ultimate concern it demands that all other concerns, economic well-being, health and life, family, aesthetic and cognitive truth justice and humanity, be sacrificed."¹²⁴ There are many other things which claim to be man's ultimate concern. But what can be the true ultimate concern for which every other thing can be sacrificed? Tillich says, "The reality of man's ultimate concern reveals something about his being, namely, that he is able to transcend the flux or relative and transitory experiences of his ordinary life."¹²⁵ The ultimate concern is something which makes man transcendental to the finite experience. This is so because ultimate concern itself is neither an objective one which becomes an object of man's finite experience nor a psychological subjective element, but is something which transcends both the subject and object and unites both sides of experience. Because this ultimate concern is not an object of our experience, our ordinary cognitive function cannot grasp it. Only through

121) Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice*, p. 31.

122) *Ibid.*

123) Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (Harper Torch Book, The Clister Library Harper & Row Publishers N. Y., 1957), p. 1.

124) *Ibid.*

125) *Ibid.*, p. 9.

the act of faith one can be involved in ultimate concern. This gives us a criterion for distinguishing true and false ultimacy. If the finite, such as a nation or success, which we can approach in our ordinary experience claims to be infinite, then it is a false ultimacy.¹²⁶⁾ This is what Tillich calls "idolatrous."¹²⁷⁾

The true ultimate concern has within itself the divine-demonic dialectic. It demands, on the one hand, man's union with it and it is, on the other hand, still transcendental to and separated from man and his object. When ultimate concern fulfills its realization only in the reunion with man without being separated from man, then it will be almost identical with the same moral perfection that is in all kinds of ethical systems. But moral perfection without demonic character cannot be the real ultimate concern, because it loses its transcendental and unconditional character.¹²⁸⁾ Here again we see Tillich's rejection of the traditional ethical system. Universal morality, according to Tillich, is nothing else than a false ultimate concern which excludes demonic character from itself so as to become itself the strong destructive idolatrous power against the meaning of human existence. Ultimate concern must be dialectical in its fundamental character. Our question then is: "What is ultimate concern?"

It is not easy to define ultimate concern of man. But we can arrive at defining ultimate concern by analyzing the reason why it is a serious problem for man whether or not he can have ultimate concern. In other words, what causes man the decisive difficulty in having his ultimate concern? It is nothing other than the fact that man is a finite being. The unconditional, infinite, ultimate concern always appears to man as something uncertain to accept because it is infinite while man is finite. Therefore, the act of faith which involves man in ultimate concern must include "courage." Tillich speaks about the courage thusly: "Courage as an element of faith is the daring self-affirmation of one's own being in spite of the powers of non-being which are the heritage of everything finite."¹²⁹⁾ As in the case of other existentialist, so also in the case of Tillich, the problem of human finitude is a problem of non-being. According to Tillich,

126) *Ibid.*, p. 11.

127) *Ibid.*, p. 12.

128) *Ibid.*, p. 15.

129) *Ibid.*

"man, estranged from his essentiality, he is given over to his natural fate, namely, he comes from nothing and he returns to nothing."¹³⁰⁾ The finite man before the threat of non-being always has a difficulty in grasping ultimate concern. Now we can conjecture what Tillich's definition of ultimate concern is. Ultimate concern must be intimately related to what gives man courage or power to overcome the threat of non-being.

The character of non-being is fully analyzed, in his book, *The Courage To Be*. Non-being is not something which is added simply at the end of being, i. e., "death," although non-being is strongly signified by "death." Non-being is not a concept or thing among others, rather it is the negation of every concept.¹³¹⁾ Thus non-being threatens a being every moment. A being has anxiety due to its awareness of its possible non-being.¹³²⁾ This awareness, however, is not an abstract knowledge about non-being. Anxiety is, Tillich says, "the existential awareness of non-being. 'Existential' in this sentence means that it is not the abstract knowledge of non-being which produces anxiety but the awareness that non-being is a part of one's own being."¹³³⁾ This non-being, according to Tillich, threatens a being in three different ways. He says, "non-being threatens man's ontic self-affirmation, relatively in terms of fate, absolutely in terms of death. It threatens man's spiritual self-affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness, absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. It threatens man's moral self-affirmation, relatively in terms of guilty, absolutely in terms of condemnation."¹³⁴⁾ But these are not three separate threats occurring at different occasions. Non-being threatens at any time in the same mode, but it produces three different results. Non-being which is signified by death causes "death," i. e., no more a being on the ontic level.¹³⁵⁾ Further, it causes meaninglessness which does not allow man to have an ultimate concern.¹³⁶⁾ Finally, it causes guilt which is the result of the presence of the power of demonry which prevents man from identifying himself with moral perfection. To Tillich the problem of finitude does not appear in an epistemological or an empirical way as it does

130) Tillich, *Systematic Theology II*, (Chicago, 1957), p. 66.

131) Tillich, *The Courage To Be* (New Haven & London Yale University Press, 1952), p. 34.

132) *Ibid.*, p. 35.

133) *Ibid.*

134) *Ibid.*, p. 41.

135) *Ibid.*, p. 43.

136) *Ibid.*, p. 47.

to moralists like Kant, and Hegel. Rather, to Tillich, as well as to other existentialists it appears in an ontological way. He sees man as being on the brink of losing his being, his ultimate concern, and his infinite self-realization. To lose his being means to lose the dialectic of "essence-existence," "divine-demonic" and "reunion-separation." Non-being threatens being in the sense that non-being is about to eliminate from being either the characteristic of "being separated" (which is presupposed by "having ultimate concern") or the characteristic of "reunion," so that being may be in danger of the possible loss of its ontological self-affirmation. This loss of ontological self-affirmation will be absolutized at the loss of ontic self-affirmation, i. e., death.

Now the question arises; "Is there a 'courage to be,' a courage to affirm one's self in spite of the threat against one's ontic and ontological self-affirmation?" If there is a "courage to be" against non-being's threatening, it still includes a risk. In Tillich's own words, "Courage always includes a risk, it is always threatened by non-being, whether the risk of losing one's self and becoming a thing within the whole of things or of losing one's world in an empty self-related."¹³⁷ This courage, including the risk of losing the self can be possibly obtained by being only through being-itself. "Non-being is not foreign to being, but the quality of being by which everything that participates in being is negated."¹³⁸ Non-being is the negation of being within being-itself. Being-itself embraces non-being. "It is logically obvious," Tillich says, "non-being is possible only as the negation of being. So being logically precedes non-being?"¹³⁹ This means that being-itself has the power of being which is the possibility of self-affirmation in spite of the negation of non-being.

Up to this point, we have seen that, according to Tillich, the problem of human finitude can be solved only by being-itself. Then the question as to what the true ultimate concern is can easily be answered. Ultimate concern demands from man a whole commitment to it. This means that when one has ultimate concern he has to give up all other things for the sake of it. If this is so, then only ultimate concern itself can enable man to have that ultimate concern because man already has thrown away ever-

137) *Ibid.*, p. 155.

138) Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice*, p. 38.

139) *Ibid.*

thing (even himself) other than ultimate concern and there by does not have any relationship with other things except it (ultimate concern). It consequently means that being-itself must be the only true ultimate concern which transcends the subject-object split because only it, as we have seen, can enable man to have ultimate concern by means of overcoming non-being's threatening.

Now our first question, namely, "Where does the love which makes the reunion possible come from?" can be answered. Love drives man to the reunion. The reunion, in turn, as we have seen, is man's reunion with the ultimate concern which is now known as being-itself. This reunion is also known to be possible only through being-itself. Therefore, love must be something that has originated from being-itself.

d. Tillich's Ethics and the "Transmoral"

Tillich's "Christian Ethics"¹⁴⁰ was framed in the principle of love.¹⁴¹ Only this ethics of love can solve the problem of ethics in the changing world which otherwise can never be solved adequately.¹⁴² But now it is clearly known to us that Tillich's ethics is fundamentally based upon analysis of being itself. Tillich says in his own words, "The root of the moral imperative, the criteria of its validity, the source of its contents, the force of its realization, all this can be elaborated only in terms of an analysis of man's being and universal being. There is no answer in ethics without explicit or implicit assertion about the nature of being."¹⁴³ The analysis of the nature of the nature of being has demonstrated that man's finite being can have its true meaning and this is so as far as the man's finite being can gain in being-itself the true dialectic of reunion and separation without breaking down the significance of the contradiction. Only agape love originating from being-itself can preserve this dialectic for man's being.

Now we can see clearly that Tillich's ethics of agape has the "transmoral" characteristic. His ethical principle of love is not the answer for man's problem of epistemological finitude but the answer for man's problem of ontological finitude, i. e., the threat

140) This is what Tillich calls "Ethics of Love" which can answer questions implied in changing history.

141) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 88.

142) *Ibid.*

143) Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice*, p. 74.

of non-being. The agape love is to preserve the antithetical elements in man without mediating their paradoxical character even in the presence of the threatening non-being. This is, as we have seen, exactly identical with the task of the "transmoral" structure.

In conclusion, although Tillich does not reject ethics, especially the term "ethics," he refused the traditional notion of ethics by defining ethics as the science of man's moral existence.¹⁴⁴ The term "moral existence" is diametrically opposed to the traditional notion of ethics. He accused other ethical systems which pursue man's "infinite" because of their demonic destructive power against man's existential meaning of life¹⁴⁵ and because of their breaking down the divine-demonic dialectic. "Moral existence" includes within itself the paradox of "separation and reunion." Love as the life which separates itself from itself and drives toward reunion with itself preserves this paradox which is presupposed by the "transmoral" structure.

In this sense, Tillich's ethics is not "ethical" but "transmoral." This transmoral characteristic is consistently found in his theological thinkings.

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144) *Ibid.*

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